Eclipse Foundation · github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2 · CWE-323 · CWE-1204 · CWE-20 · published 2026-11-20
CVE-2026-115407
This month Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).
CVE-2026-115407 has a public proof-of-concept exploit, but no confirmed exploitation in the wild. This github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2 vulnerability: CVSS 9.1 (v4.0), a successful attack gives total control of the component. Patch in your normal monthly cycle.
Jump to: Remediation Exploit intelAffected versionsDescription
Remediation#
No fixed version is recorded here yet. Check the vendor advisory linked from the CVE record below.
Exploit intelligence#
| Signal | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Known exploited | No | CISA KEV |
| Ransomware use | — | CISA KEV |
| EPSS (30-day exploitation probability) | — | FIRST EPSS |
| CVSS base score | 9.1 (v4.0)CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | CNA / CISA ADP |
| SSVC exploitation | poc | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC automatable | No | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC technical impact | total | CISA Vulnrichment |
Weakness: CWE-323: Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption · CWE-1204: Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV) · CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
Affected versions (from the CVE record)#
- Eclipse Foundation github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2
0through2.0.0-rc8(affected)2.0.0-rc9(unaffected)
- Eclipse Foundation github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11
0through1.6.8(affected)
- Eclipse Foundation github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11
0through1.7.0-rc1(affected)
- Eclipse Foundation github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11
0through1.2.5(affected)
Description (from the CVE record)#
In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8`, `github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1` and `github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5`), the `cipher.AEAD` returned by `SecretKey.NewGCM()` passes whatever nonce it is given straight to `CK_GCM_PARAMS` without checking its length against `NonceSize()`, and accepts an empty nonce. On a token that accepts a zero-length GCM IV — SoftHSM2 does — every `Seal` with an empty nonce encrypts under the same IV, reusing the keystream and exposing the GHASH authentication key, which allows forgeries. Separately, `Config.UseGCMIVFromHSM` sends a NULL IV with length zero to the token unless `GCMIVFromHSMControl.SupplyIvForHSMGCMEncrypt` is also set, so the token has nowhere to write the IV it generates: a `Seal` with a non-empty nonce panics after the plaintext has already been encrypted, and a `Seal` with an empty nonce returns ciphertext under an empty IV without error. On the v1 line HSM-IV mode additionally never copies the token-generated IV back to the caller, so the caller keeps its own nonce while the data was encrypted under another one.
Quoted from the CVE Program record.