Red Hat · Podman · published 2026-08-13

CVE-2026-19730Podman: podman: quadlet install --replace non-truncating write retains removed host-access directives

This month Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).

CVE-2026-19730 has a public proof-of-concept exploit, but no confirmed exploitation in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.1% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 2% of all CVEs. This Podman vulnerability: CVSS 4.2 (v3.1). Fixed upstream in Podman 6.0.0, 5.8.6. Patch in your normal monthly cycle.

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Remediation#

Fixed upstream in Podman 6.0.0, 5.8.6.

Patch events

  1. This monthSecurity release

    Container runtimePodman

    Podman security releases: 6.0.0, 5.8.6

    Upgrade to 6.0.05.8.6

    Why: Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).

Exploit intelligence#

SignalValueSource
Known exploitedNoCISA KEV
Ransomware use—CISA KEV
EPSS (30-day exploitation probability)0.1% (3th pct)FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15
CVSS base score4.2 (v3.1)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
CNA / CISA ADP
SSVC exploitationpocCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC automatableNoCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC technical impactpartialCISA Vulnrichment

Affected versions (from the CVE record)#

Description (from the CVE record)#

The 'podman quadlet install --replace' command opens the existing destination file with O_CREATE|O_WRONLY but omits O_TRUNC. When the initial reflink copy attempt fails (common on non-reflink-capable filesystems including many RHEL default XFS configurations), the fallback in ReflinkOrCopy uses io.Copy which performs a non-truncating write. If the original Quadlet is larger than the new Quadlet, the file is not truncated and content from the original is preserved. The command completes with no warning. There is no risk of information leakage as the user already had access to the Quadlet in order to replace it, and in most cases, this would only lead to invalid Quadlet files. However, security-related options from the end of the old Quadlet could be included in the new Quadlet, and if the truncation resulted in a valid Quadlet file, this could result in undesirable behavior. For example, running podman quadlet install --replace to remove a single line from the end of a Quadlet - including security-sensitive content, like AddCapability - will fail, and the option will continue to be used. Further, with Volume Quadlets, this can include additional mounts which can cause content to be unintentionally exposed into containers. If, later, the image is updated then compromised content might be leaked to an attacker. The vulnerable code paths are in pkg/domain/infra/abi/quadlet.go (lines 338-360, O_CREATE|O_WRONLY without O_TRUNC) and vendor/go.podman.io/storage/pkg/fileutils/reflink_linux.go (lines 12-19, non-truncating io.Copy fallback).

Quoted from the CVE Program record.

Elsewhere#

Distro status: Debian · Ubuntu · Red Hat · Alpine

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