Erlang · Erlang/OTP · published 2026-05-27

CVE-2026-42790nameConstraints DNS bypass via subject CommonName fallback in public_key hostname verification

Routine No exploitation evidence; EPSS 0.4%.

CVE-2026-42790 is not known to be exploited in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.4% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 30% of all CVEs. This Erlang/OTP vulnerability: CVSS 7.6 (v4.0), a successful attack gives total control of the component. Fixed upstream in Erlang/OTP 29.1.2, 29.0.1, 28.5.0.8, 28.5.0.1 (+3 more). Routine: patch when convenient.

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Remediation#

Fixed upstream in Erlang/OTP 29.1.2, 29.0.1, 28.5.0.8, 28.5.0.1, 27.3.4.19, 27.3.4.12, 26.2.5.21.

Patch events

  1. This monthSecurity release

    Language runtimeErlang/OTP

    Erlang/OTP security fixes: 3 CVEs

    Upgrade to 29.1.229.0.128.5.0.828.5.0.127.3.4.1927.3.4.1226.2.5.21

    Why: Vendor security release for server software (most severe: CVE-2026-42790).

Exploit intelligence#

SignalValueSource
Known exploitedNoCISA KEV
Ransomware use—CISA KEV
EPSS (30-day exploitation probability)0.4% (30th pct)FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15
CVSS base score7.6 (v4.0)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CNA / CISA ADP
SSVC exploitationnoneCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC automatableNoCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC technical impacttotalCISA Vulnrichment

Affected versions (from the CVE record)#

Description (from the CVE record)#

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification. Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First, pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName. Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher. This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 26.2.5.21, OTP 27.3.4.12, OTP 28.5.0.1, and OTP 29.0.1, corresponding to public_key from 1.4 before 1.15.1.7, 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1.

Quoted from the CVE Program record.

Elsewhere#

Distro status: Debian · Ubuntu · Red Hat · Alpine

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