OpenSSL · OpenSSL · published 2026-06-09

CVE-2026-45445AES-OCB IV Ignored on EVP_Cipher() Path

Routine No exploitation evidence; EPSS 0.7%.

CVE-2026-45445 is not known to be exploited in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.7% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 54% of all CVEs. This OpenSSL vulnerability: CVSS 7.5 (v3.1), attacks can be automated. Fixed upstream in OpenSSL 4.0.1, 3.6.3, 3.5.7, 3.4.6 (+3 more). Routine: patch when convenient.

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Remediation#

Fixed upstream in OpenSSL 4.0.1, 3.6.3, 3.5.7, 3.4.6, 3.0.21, 1.1.1zh, 1.0.2zq.

Patch events

  1. This monthSecurity release

    Crypto libraryOpenSSL

    OpenSSL security fixes: 18 CVEs

    Upgrade to 4.0.13.6.33.5.73.4.63.0.211.1.1zh1.0.2zq

    Why: CVE-2026-34182: EPSS 1.1% with high severity (CVSS 9.1).

Exploit intelligence#

SignalValueSource
Known exploitedNoCISA KEV
Ransomware use—CISA KEV
EPSS (30-day exploitation probability)0.7% (54th pct)FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15
CVSS base score7.5 (v3.1)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
CNA / CISA ADP
SSVC exploitationnoneCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC automatableYesCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC technical impactpartialCISA Vulnrichment

Affected versions (from the CVE record)#

Description (from the CVE record)#

Issue summary: When an application drives an AES-OCB context through the public EVP_Cipher() one-shot interface, the application-supplied initialisation vector (IV) is silently discarded. Impact summary: Every message encrypted under the same key uses the same effective nonce regardless of the IV supplied by the caller, resulting in (key, nonce) reuse and loss of confidentiality. If the same code path is used to compute the authentication tag, the tag depends only on the (key, IV) pair and not on the plaintext or ciphertext, allowing universal forgery of arbitrary ciphertext from a single captured message. OpenSSL provides two ways to drive a cipher: the documented streaming interface (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) and a lower-level one-shot, EVP_Cipher(), whose documentation explicitly recommends against use by applications in favour of EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). The OCB provider's streaming handler flushes the application-supplied IV into the OCB context before processing data; the one-shot handler did not. Every call to EVP_Cipher() on an AES-OCB context therefore ran with the all-zero key-derived offset state left by cipher initialisation, regardless of the caller's IV. If EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() is subsequently used to obtain the authentication tag, the deferred IV setup runs at that point and clears the running checksum that should have been accumulated over the plaintext. The resulting tag is a function of (key, IV) only and verifies against any ciphertext produced under the same (key, IV) pair. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected: AES-OCB is not a TLS cipher suite, and libssl does not call EVP_Cipher() in any case. Applications that drive AES-OCB through the documented streaming AEAD API (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) are not affected. Only applications that combine the AES-OCB cipher with the EVP_Cipher() one-shot API are vulnerable. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as AES-OCB is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Quoted from the CVE Program record.

Elsewhere#

Distro status: Debian · Ubuntu · Red Hat · Alpine

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