open-webui · Open WebUI · published 2026-06-18
CVE-2026-54017Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal
This month Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).
CVE-2026-54017 has a public proof-of-concept exploit, but no confirmed exploitation in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.4% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 37% of all CVEs. This Open WebUI vulnerability: CVSS 7.7 (v3.1). Fixed upstream in Open WebUI 0.9.6, 0.8.11. Patch in your normal monthly cycle.
Jump to: Remediation Exploit intelAffected versionsDescription
Remediation#
Fixed upstream in Open WebUI 0.9.6, 0.8.11.
Patch events
AI toolingOpen WebUI
Open WebUI security releases: 0.9.6, 0.8.11
Upgrade to
0.9.60.8.11Why: CVE-2026-54011: Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).
Exploit intelligence#
| Signal | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Known exploited | No | CISA KEV |
| Ransomware use | — | CISA KEV |
| EPSS (30-day exploitation probability) | 0.4% (37th pct) | FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15 |
| CVSS base score | 7.7 (v3.1)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N | CNA / CISA ADP |
| SSVC exploitation | poc | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC automatable | No | CISA Vulnrichment |
| SSVC technical impact | partial | CISA Vulnrichment |
Affected versions (from the CVE record)#
- open-webui open-webui
< 0.9.6(affected)
Description (from the CVE record)#
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services. This is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here: first, raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report); and second, a bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`). The attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation. Version 0.9.6 fixes the issue.
Quoted from the CVE Program record.