Erlang · Erlang/OTP · published 2026-09-01

CVE-2026-69664httpd parks a request worker indefinitely on a malformed chunk size sent after the headers

This month Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).

CVE-2026-69664 has a public proof-of-concept exploit, but no confirmed exploitation in the wild. EPSS estimates a 0.9% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 62% of all CVEs. This Erlang/OTP vulnerability: CVSS 8.7 (v4.0), attacks can be automated. Fixed upstream in Erlang/OTP 29.1.2, 29.0.6, 28.5.0.8, 28.5.0.6 (+2 more). Patch in your normal monthly cycle.

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Remediation#

Fixed upstream in Erlang/OTP 29.1.2, 29.0.6, 28.5.0.8, 28.5.0.6, 27.3.4.19, 27.3.4.17.

Patch events

  1. This monthSecurity release

    Language runtimeErlang/OTP

    Erlang/OTP security fixes: 16 CVEs

    Upgrade to 29.1.229.0.628.5.0.828.5.0.627.3.4.1927.3.4.17

    Why: CVE-2026-69664: Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC exploitation: poc).

Exploit intelligence#

SignalValueSource
Known exploitedNoCISA KEV
Ransomware use—CISA KEV
EPSS (30-day exploitation probability)0.9% (62th pct)FIRST EPSS v2026.06.15
CVSS base score8.7 (v4.0)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CNA / CISA ADP
SSVC exploitationpocCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC automatableYesCISA Vulnrichment
SSVC technical impactpartialCISA Vulnrichment

Affected versions (from the CVE record)#

Description (from the CVE record)#

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpd allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service by sending a request with a chunked body whose chunk-size line is not a hexadecimal number. The worker serving the connection is never released and no timeout reclaims it, so repeating the request across connections occupies every available worker and denies service to legitimate clients. No authentication is required and the default configuration is affected. The chunk-size line must arrive in a write separate from the headers. When the body accompanies the headers, httpd_request_handler:handle_body/3 calls http_chunk:decode/3 inside a try ... catch throw:Error, so the {error, {chunk_size, _}} thrown by http_chunk:decode_size/4 is answered with 400 Bad Request. When the chunk size arrives later, the decoder is resumed through a bare catch in httpd_request_handler:handle_info/2, which converts the throw into a return value rather than raising it; the resulting error tuple is then treated as the next decoder continuation, the socket is re-armed, and the worker waits for data that never comes. The request timeout has already been cancelled at the point the headers were accepted, and the periodic byte-rate check is only armed when minimum_bytes_per_second is configured, which it is not by default. This issue affects OTP from OTP 18.1.4 before OTP 27.3.4.17, OTP 28.5.0.6, and OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 6.0.3 before 9.3.2.7, 9.6.2.3, and 9.7.2.

Quoted from the CVE Program record.

Elsewhere#

Distro status: Debian · Ubuntu · Red Hat · Alpine

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